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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The nature of the case and course of proceedings have been set forth in Appellant/Cross 
Respondent's Brief filed by Mark Van ("Van"). Respondent/Cross-Respondent ("Portneuf') has 
submitted its version of the nature of the case and has not disputed the course of proceedings set 
forth in Appellant's Brief. Facts relevant to matters addressed in Respondent's Brief are set forth 
below. 
II. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. The District Court did not err in refusing to award Portneuf attorney fees on its 
underlying claims, including but not limited to breach of contract claims. 
2. Respondent/Cross-Appellant's request for attorney fees on appeal based upon Idaho 
Code § 12-121 must be denied. 
3. To the extent this Court determines that any of Respondent/Cross-Appellant's 
arguments and cross/appeal are grounded in Idaho Code §12-120, and determines that 
Appellant/Cross-Respondent is the prevailing party on such arguments and/or cross-appeal, 
Appellant/Cross-Respondent is entitled to attorney fees on appeal under I.C. §12-120. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE JURY'S SPECIAL VERDICT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
Portneuf attaches great significance to the fact that the jury tookjust three hours to reach its 
decision, implying that there was no question as to the legitimacy of Van's termination. 
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Respondent's Brief, p. 16. Van, on the other hand, asserts that the shortness ofthe time the jury took 
to deliberate more accurately reflects that the jury's decision was hurriedly made and was based 
more on emotion than the substance of the facts before it. Based on the amount of testimony given 
and the hundreds of documents admitted into evidence, the jury could not have reviewed such 
testimony and material in any depth whatsoever before reaching its conclusion. The jury's hurried 
verdict certainly was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
1. Portneuf's Portrayal Of The Evidence Borders on The Preposterous 
Portneuf claims that the trial evidence showed that Van was an employee who was 
unmanageable, distrustful, and eager to spread distrust throughout the team. Respondent's Brief, p. 
18. This argument is typical of and consistent with Portneuf' s negative, disrespectful opinion of V an 
through the last few months of his employment. There is not substantial, competent evidence to 
show that Van was unmanageable or distrustful. These negative attributes were simply nurtured and 
disseminated through Portneuf until enough of such sentiment was drummed up that Portneuf felt 
justified in getting rid of Van. 
Portneuf asserts that Van tried to show that everyone around him was full of lies and deceit. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 25. Nothing could be further from the truth. The evidence shows that Van 
was reporting protected activity, nothing more. If Van had truly been out to show everyone was 
lying, then why was he never given any formal discipline? Why did he receive no verbal or written 
warnings before his termination? Ifhe was trying to show that everyone was full of deceit, why was 
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he not required to prepare a performance improvement plan? Why was he given a satisfactory 
evaluation in 2005 and a merit raise increase just before his termination? 
Surely, if Portneuf had actual evidence that Van was as terrible as it claims, it would have 
presented such evidence, such as straight-forward and immediate disciplinary action. The actual 
evidence presented to the jury doesn't show this at all. The evidence shows that he received 
satisfactory performance evaluations as well as merit raises and was required to perform a heavy 
maintenance project and night goggle certification just before his termination. Substantial evidence 
does not support a verdict that Portneuf's reasons for termination were legitimate. 
2. The Evidence before the Jury Showed that Portneuf Protected its Pilots and 
Disfavored Van. 
Portneufagues that because of his mistrust and his desire to have it his own way, Van was 
unable or willing to accept decisions made by the LifeFlight program and hospital administration 
regarding policies, discipline, and organization. Respondent's Brief, p. 32. Again this accusation 
is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. The actual evidence shows that the Pilots 
of Life Flight were not terminated like Van was even though their actions were much more egregious. 
The pilots were given run of the roost, and Van was chastised and ultimately terminated because he 
challenged their attitudes toward safety and federal regulations. 
Van provided Pam Humphrey with a grievance against Alzola and obviously nothing was 
done because Alzola didn't even know that Van had filed a grievance against him. Pam Niece, V.P 
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of Human Resources made light of the idea that Alzola had lied to Van. Humphrey admitted telling 
Van that there was nothing she could do with Alzola and that she was not going to terminate him. 
Alzola told Van that it was none ofthe mechanic's business ifthere was ice and snow on the 
blades, that it was between the FAA and the pilots. Van felt the statement was typical of Alzola' s 
condescending attitude. Alzola also tried to pull rank on Van by saying that only the pilot in 
command has the responsibility and authority to determine aircraft worthiness. In an email to Pam 
Humphrey, Alzola insulted mechanics as being "home in bed with their families" while pilots were 
up "making safety happen". Finally, during the April 1, 2005 meeting involving Van, Alzola, 
Fletcher, Humphrey, and Neilsen, Van said that he didn't want to see another accident, and Alzola 
got angry, stormed out of the room, and slammed the door. Van's alleged workplace demeanor was 
nothing compared to Alzola's hot-headedness. 
Flight nurse paramedic Lance Taysom, flight paramedic Greg Vickers and communications 
supervisor Ann McCarty all thought Alzola was condescending. This evidence of Alzola's actions 
and attitude would certainly be viewed by any other business organization as a failure to maintain 
positive interpersonal relations with colleagues and failure to foster a positive team environment 
(Portneurs reasons for Van's termination). And yet, Portneuf stood by and upheld Alzola in his 
position. All of this evidence indicates that Alzola was certainly protected, while Van was not. The 
evidence presented to the jury showed that Portneuf demeaned and demoralized Van because he was 
unwilling to let this protectionist attitude go unchallenged. 
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Chief pilot and safety officer Fergie did not maintain positive interpersonal relations and 
foster a positive team environment, particularly when it came to Van. Van heard Fergie state that 
ifhe was Tim Brulotte, he wouldn't tell the FAA what had happened about the accident, that they 
could figure it out by themselves. Discussion was had between Neilsen, Waller and Van that Fergie 
had actually altered documents to make it appear that he had gotten his appropriate amount of crew 
rest time. Fergie flew low directly over Van's house in retaliation for raising the issue of Fergie's 
20 hour duty day in the August 2003 LifeFlight meeting. 
Just before Van's termination, Fergie, Alzola, Neilsen and Mortimer were all talking about 
Van's emails that were sent to Alzola regarding snow and ice on the rotor blades - emails that were 
not addressed to Neilsen, Fergie or Mortimer. Fergie also told Fletcher that Van was responsible for 
an Agusta representative leaving and for creating an unsafe atmosphere in which everyone was 
"looking over their shoulders". Ex. 582 - PMC 001264. This evidence clearly shows that Fergie did 
not try to improve personal relations or a working team environment with Van and yet Fergie was 
promoted to Director of Operations after Van was terminated. 
Neilsen literally harassed Van in retaliation for the way Van drew a connection between 
Neilsen's October 2004 flight and Fergie's failure to deice the helicopter in February, 2005. Once 
Neilsen's intimidation was brought to the attention of management, Portneufhad an obligation to 
put a stop to it. Neither Alzola or Humphrey ever did anything to address the issue with Neilsen and 
Van on the helipad. 
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During the April 1, 2005 meeting, a discussion was held about the word "negligent" and 
Neilsen became very angry. Van asked Neilsen to explain how he knew there wasn't ice on the 
blades and Neilsen told him, "let me explain it so that even you can understand it." Neilsen also 
made the statement that mechanics were just pilot helpers. Neilsen did state that he probably 
shouldn't have approached Van on the helipad when he was so angry, but that was the only statement 
Van remembered as even coming close to being an apology. In sum, Neilsen's conduct toward Van 
was out-right harassment, and yet Neilsen stayed on while Van was booted out. This evidence of 
Portnuers disparate treatment of Van certainly dispels any claim that team dysfunction originated 
with Van. 
3. The Evidence before the Jury Showed Pam Humphrey Was Also Divisive Toward 
Van. 
Substantial evidence in the record shows that Pam Humphrey clearly labeled Van as a 
troublemaker. Humphrey wrote in a July 13,2003 document that if she didn't before, she truly had 
an axe to grind against Van then. Humphrey perpetuated the false rumor that Van's interactions with 
Agusta deteriorated to the point where an Agusta mechanic walked off the job. 
Thirteen minutes after Humphrey wrote Van an email thanking him for information on the 
helicopter, she emailed her boss stating, "I know you do not know the history here, but he does not 
trust anyone, and he's always causing problems of some sort." Humphrey was asked if that email 
promoted team building and she responded that she couldn't answer the question. It is obvious that 
she wouldn't answer because the truth would have made her other testimony appear less credible. 
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The evidence also shows that Humphrey got really mad at Van when he reported the damage 
to the cowling caused by Neilsen. After Van submitted his justification for hiring to Humphrey, 
Humphrey sent emails to her boss of what she believed to be Van's poor character and demanded 
an aggressive disciplinary process be started if Van was not terminated. Nothing happened, likely 
because Portneuf realized that Humphrey's attitude toward Van was blown totally out of proportion. 
Humphrey prohibited Van from discussing the cold weather policy with Fergie in January, 
2005. She cut Van off in a LifeFlight leadership meeting on March 24,2005. She then promised 
Van a special safety meeting to address his concerns only to cancel it later. Just prior to Van's 
termination, Humphrey never indicated to CEO Hermansen that the pilots were responsible for any 
friction that was occurring. The vast evidence shows that Humphrey was not trying to maintain 
positive interpersonal relations and foster a positive team environment with Van, and yet it was Van 
who was fired. 
4. There is No Substantial, Competent Evidence to Show That Van's Personal Conflicts 
Were Interfering With LifeFlight 
Portneuf contends that Van's distrust and unwillingness to accept solutions from others were 
interfering with the ability of LifeFlight to function effectively. Respondent's Brief, p. 35. Again, 
this claim is not supported by the evidence. The best evidence that Portneuf can produce here is 
personal opinion that there was a concern about safety or that safety "may" be a concern. 
Respondent's Brief, pp. 35-36. There was no solid evidence presented to the court that Van was 
causing safety problems. 
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Humphrey never had an occasional mechanic come to her and say that he was not going to 
work because of Van's attitude. Stoltz had a good working relationship with Van and indicated that 
Van never asked him to do anything that was inappropriate. McCarty never considered Van to be 
a safety risk. Pilot Waller trusted Van and never found Van to be difficult to work with or 
uncooperative. Neilsen said that he trusted Van. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 573, 11. 1-8. Fletcher testified that 
Van was never rude or negative with her. Even Defendant's own expert, James Wisecup, did not 
find or review any documentation indicating that Van shouted at anyone during his employment or 
that Van wrote any email that was threatening. This evidence certainly shows that Van was not 
creating safety issues. Even taking Portneuf s evidence in a light most positive to Portneuf, Van 
alleged conduct was not as divisive as that of Alzola, Fergie, Nielson and Humphrey. 
Portneuf presented absolutely no evidence to show that Neilsen attempted to regain a 
working relationship with Van prior to the April 1 meeting. It was Van who requested the meeting 
to get working relationship back. If Van really distrusted and disliked the pilots as much as Portneuf 
alleges, he would have been clamoring to have Neilsen fired, not trying to rebuild a relationship with 
him. Portneuf s arguments fail miserably when the actual evidence is considered. 
Another question that arises is if Van was really undermining the team, why didn't the team 
come forward? Mortimer initially raised issues regarding Van and the pilots, and the record shows 
that Mortimer was talking to Fergie who was really undermining rather than building the team. 
Stoltz did not bring any complaints against Van. Greg Vickers didn't bring up any complaint about 
Van because "it hadn't come to that point." McCarty never raised any concern about Van to any 
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member of management and had no reason to do so. Waller never made a report about Van to anyone 
in management. Lance Taysom felt comfortable and never had any problem with Van. Romero 
never raised any complaints about Van. He trusted Van as much as he trusted the pilots. Had Van 
really been affecting the team, they would have come forward before Fletcher decided to do her 
interviews. 
To the extent that the pilots felt that they were walking on egg shells and being critically 
observed, it started with the pilots not following regulations. The evidence shows that Fergie 
exercised extremely poor judgment when he logged 20 hours duty time. He violated an FAA 
regulation when he did not get ten hours crew rest. He was negligent when he flew the helicopter 
without lights. He risked the safety of the LifeFlight crew when he did not install blade covers the 
night before Neilsen took off in October, 2004. He risked the safety of the crew when he didn't wipe 
down the blades on or about January 31, 2005. He risked the safety of the crew when he didn't 
remove snow and ice from the rotor blades the morning of February 1. Fergie was upset with Van 
because his shortcoming were being brought to light. It made him look bad to other team members. 
Neilsen was upset because Van connected his October, 2004 flight with Fergie's negligence 
in February, 2005. Raw feelings certainly existed among the pilots. Logically, Van's standing up 
to the pilots meant that feathers were going to get ruffled. However, such hurt feelings must not 
serve as a proper basis for an employer to tum on a whistleblower. 
5. Van Raised Issues That Truly Had Not Been Resolved. 
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Portneuf asserts that Van would bring up issues, would not accept solutions, and would 
continue to bring those situations up in the future, resulting in nothing ever being resolved. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 37. The evidence actually shows that Van would work to resolve an issue 
and the issue would occur again, as if no one was taking the issue seriously. 
Tim Brulotte's 2001 accident had a serious impact upon Van as well as all of the LifeFlight 
team. Brulotte had been on duty 17 hours and was fatigued when the accident occurred. Logic 
dictates that following the accident, Portneuf would have implemented sufficiently stringent policies 
to prevent this type of occurrence from happening again. The evidence shows, however that a 
stricter policy was not implemented and enforced until after Fergie's 20 hour duty time incident. 
Fergie knew that he violated federal regulations by not obtaining ten hours crew rest before 
returning to duty. Fergie admitted to Waller that he was going to take heat from the FAA. One 
would think that Fergie would be deterred from future safety related violations. However, Fergie 
subsequently flew the helicopter at night without lights and overflew an airworthiness directive. 
Fergie personally investigated the issue of whether Neilsen flew with snow and ice on the 
rotor blades in October, 2004. No doubt, Fergie understood that an underlying issue was whether 
Neilsen had actually performed a pre-flight inspection. And yet Fergie allowed rotor blade covers 
to be installed over ice and snow and did not perform a pre-flight inspection on the morning of 
February 1. 
The ice on the helicopter on February 1,2005 gave Van specific reason to believe that the 
cold weather policy was not being followed. He was legitimately concerned that failure to follow 
ApPELLANT/CROSS RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF -10-
the policy would lead to a violation of an FAA regulation. It was only reasonable that Van would 
relate the October, 2004 incident to the February 1 incident. 
Additionally, to the extent that Van was raising issues again in the March 24 meeting and in 
his March 28 letter to crew members, he was raising the issues to address Fergie's misrepresentation 
of what Stoltz had said about the October, 2004 incident. Humphrey had not allowed Van to address 
such issues by cutting him off and then denying him the right to be heard at a special safety meeting. 
Portneuf argues that is seriously listened to Van and adopted his suggestions, but the 
evidence really shows that regulations were not taken seriously and problems kept arising. When 
Van kept reporting the problems, Portneuf got fed up and got rid of him. 
6. Van Would Not Have Been Subjected to the Same Disciplinary Action if He Had Not 
Engaged in the Protected Activity 
The sequence of events from October, 2004 through April, 2005 show that if Van had not 
reported the incidents relating to snow and ice on the blade covers, Portneuf would not have 
terminated Van. Portneuf argues that this premise is too attenuated and that Van's reports just 
brought underlying trust issues to the forefront. Respondent's Brief, p. 39. Portneuf again denies 
responsibility here. To the extent that trust issues were brought to the forefront, it was because the 
pilots were not doing their jobs and were then minimizing their actions. 
Had Neilsen performed a thorough pre-flight inspection at the end of October, 2004, there 
would have been no report for Van to make. Neilsen would have cleaned the snow and ice off of 
the helicopter and Stoltz would not have had any concerns about the rotor blades being ready for 
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flight. Had Fergie wiped of the rotor blades at the end of January, 2005, there would not have been 
significant snow and ice on the blades the next morning. Given that Fergie did fail to wipe offthe 
blades, there still would have been no problem for Van to report had Fergie performed a thorough 
pre-flight and cleaned off the blades when he came on shift the next morning. 
If Fergie and Alzola had not been talking about and showing Van's emails to Neilsen, 
Neilsen would likely not have approached Van on the helipad. There would have been no reason 
for Van to ask for the Aprill, 2005 meeting. If Fergie had not minimized Stoltz' report of snow and 
ice on the rotor blades to say that there was only frost on the blades, Van would not have had that 
issue to raise in the March 24 meeting. If Humphrey had let Van voice his concerns in the March 
24 meeting rather than cut him off, Van would have been able to discuss his concerns with the 
LifeFlight team rather than write his March 28 letter. Finally, if Audrey Fletcher had actually 
utilized the Aprill meeting for the reason it was called, to rebuild the relationship between Neilsen 
and Van, there likely would have been no interviews and no termination. 
There is a direct connection between Portneuf's actions, Van's reports, and Portneuf s 
decision to terminate. The events in 2004-2005 as they related to Portneufs potential violations of 
FAA regulations ultimately led to the April 1 meeting. The proximity of that meeting to the 
termination leads to the conclusion that Van's reports resulted in his termination. Therefore, the 
evidence presented by Portneuf, upon which the jury apparently relied, does not reflect what really 
happened. 
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But for Portneufs wrongful actions, Van would have had nothing to report. Although 
Portneufwould argue that Van would have created conflict anyway, the evidence doesn't support 
that argument. The evidence does show that when Portneuf engaged in acts that constituted 
violations or potential violations, Van would reasonably report the problem. But for Van's reports 
of protected activity, his termination would not have occurred. 
7. Van's Termination Was a Direct Result of His Whistleblowing Activities 
Prior to the beginning of the jury trial, the district court ruled that waiting for the 
administrative law judge's decision in the OSHA case was not a sufficient reason to delay the trial 
in state court. The administrative law judge's decision was released during the trial and was later 
affirmed by the Administrative Review Board of the U.S. Department of Labor ("ARB"). Van v. 
PortneufMedical Center, ("OSHA Appeal Decision"), ARB Nos. 11-028, 12-043, ALJ No. 2007-
AIR-2 (ARB Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARBIDECISIONS/ARB_Decisions/ 
AIR/II 028.AIRP.HTM. 
The ARB found in part: 
In this case, following a lengthy hearing, the ALJ entered a 97-page decision 
determining that PMC violated the employment protection provision of AIR 21 when 
it terminated Van after he complained about the air safety measures taken for the 
helicopter utilized by the Hospital's LifeFlight program during cold weather 
conditions. 
* * * 
PMC argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's determination that 
the hospital would have fired Van even absent the protected activity. This argument 
also lacks merit. 
* * * 
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Although PMC argued below that Van was fired due to his "inability to maintain 
positive interpersonal relations," the ALl rejected PMC's contention as not supported 
by the evidence of record. 
* * * 
We find no reason to disturb the ALl's well-supported and well-reasoned ruling. 
OSHA Appeal Decision, pp. 7, 8 and 9. 
Van fully recognizes that the legal standards in the OSHA case are different than those before 
this Court. However, the facts of both the OSHA case and the trial court case were identical. The 
same evidence was presented. The ARB decision therefore does set precedent as to the facts of 
Van's whistleblower claims. The ARB found Portneuf s arguments regarding the evidence to be 
without merit. This finding should have been the finding of the jury in the state court case, and 
would have been had Portneufs counsel correctly represented the law and had the district court 
followed the law. 
If the evidence had really shown that Van was an unmanageable, distrustful employee who 
was eager to spread distrust throughout the team, the ALl and the ARB would have found such to 
be the case. The federal court decisions regarding the facts should be recognized as precedent here. 
While there may normally be some merit to the argument that the jury can disagree with both 
the ALl and the ARB, there is a great difference between these entities regarding the time spent in 
the deliberation of the facts. The time spent by the ALl in writing a 97 page decision is likely 30 or 
more times the amount the jury spent deliberating. Had the jury actually spent the time to study the 
facts, the verdict would have been consistent with the decisions of the ALl and ARB. 
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The ARB also upheld the ALl's decision to require Portneuf to expunge all negative, 
derogatory information that pertains to Van's firing. OSHA Appeal Decision, p. 9. Arguably, 
Portneufs arguments should be quite limited because all negative information pertaining to Van's 
termination no longer exists. 
B. THE JURY'S SPECIAL VERDICT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE NATURE OF 
WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIMS AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
Portneuf claims that the jury's verdict does not undermine the legislative goal of protecting 
employees and that the jury explicitly found that Van was not terminated because of his protected 
activity of reporting safety violations. Respondent's Brief, p. 41. Portneuf further asserts that 
because Van failed to prove his prima facie case, the burden never shifted to Portneuf to show a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination. Respondent's Brief, p. 39. These arguments 
mis-characterize the jury's actual verdict do not paint an accurate presentation of the proceedings. 
The third question on the special verdict form presented to the jury consisted of two parts: 
Did Mark Van prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Portneuf Medical 
Center terminated his employment because he communicated to Portneuf Medical 
Center, in good faith, violations or suspected violations of laws, rules, or regulations 
adopted under the law of this state, a political subdivision of the state, or of the 
United States, and that Portneuf Medical Center's reason for terminating Mr. Van 
was not believable or that it was not the true reason? (Emphasis added.) 
R. Vol. III, pp. 531-532. 
Obviously the above question is compound. The question asks the jury whether Van proved 
that he was terminated for his protected activity and whether he proved that Portneuf s reason for 
terminating Van was not believable or not the true reason. Given the way in which the question is 
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written, Portneuf would have had to show that it presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for Van's termination in order for Van to prove it unbelievable. If the burden never truly shifted, 
then the jury did not fully answer the question. 
Portneufterminated Van based upon his "inability to maintain positive interpersonal relations 
with your colleagues and foster a positive team environment". Van therefore was given the burden 
of showing that these reasons were unbelievable or not the real reasons. A plain reading ofthe jury's 
response is that Van didn't meet his burden. The jury did not expressly find that Van was not 
terminated because of his protected activity because such a question was not presented to the jury. 
Van certainly acknowledges that the third question was approved by the court and all parties. 
Nonetheless, the question creates a serious conundrum for an employee who is fired for supposedly 
"not getting along with co-workers". Van's burden was impossible to accomplish because 
Portneufs reasons, when taken in context of his whistleblowing activities, were accurate, at least 
to a certain degree. Van could not have maintained positive personal relations and foster a positive 
team environment because he was reporting pilot's faults which made the pilots mad. He could not 
meet his burden as to the second prong of the question because it was not possible given the facts 
of the case. 
If the jury's verdict is upheld, a dangerous precedent will be set for all future public 
employees. All the employer will have to do to prevail will be to argue that the employee wouldn't 
get along with others. This result essentially renders the Whistleblower act null and void. No 
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whistleblower will win because the act of whistle blowing does not foster a positive team environment. 
Portneuf faults Van for not proposing a special verdict form or jury instructions concerning 
discord arising from whistleblowing activities. Respondent's Brief, p. 40. This argument is 
inaccurate because Van did request instructions which dealt with the very issue of discord. The 
instructions, as set forth in Appellant/Cross Respondent's Brief include the following: 
Expressions of anger by an employee can be justified while he/she is pursuing 
complaints against the employer or suspected or actual violations oflaws, rules and 
regulation. 
*** 
It would be ironic if not absurd, to hold that one loses the protection of an anti-
discrimination statute if one gets visibly or audibly upset about discriminatory 
conduct. 
*** 
An employer cannot provoke an employer to a point where he commits an 
indiscretion in connection with the pursuit of his complaints and then rely on this to 
terminate his employment. 
The above jury instructions pertain to an employee's inability to maintain positive 
interpersonal relations and foster a positive team environment while pursuing complaints against the 
employer. Getting angry or visibly or audibly upset about discriminatory conduct or committing an 
indiscretion in connection with the pursuit of complaints most definitely can be perceived as not 
fostering a positive team environment. 
The evidence clearly shows that when Van was pursuing complaints against the pilots and 
reporting protected activity, Portneuf percei ved Van's actions and attitude as not fostering a positive 
team environment. Van wrote Policy Letter 12 because Alzola kept saying in the August 2003 
meeting that nothing was wrong with Fergie's 20 hour duty day and that the mechanics couldn't tell 
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the pilots if they were going to fly or not. Portneuf repeatedly portrayed to the jury that Policy Letter 
12 was damning evidence that Van was destroying the LifeFlight team. Additionally, Van's March 
28, 2005 letter was considered extremely divisive by Portneuf. However, Van wrote the letter 
because his pursuit of his complaints had been stopped dead in its tracks by Humphrey. 
Had the above jury instructions been given to the jury, the jury would have been able to give 
leeway to Van with regard to his actions. With these instructions given, Van would have been able 
to meet his burden by establishing that discord was the natural result of reporting protected activity 
and that such discord cannot be a legitimate reason for termination. 
Inclusion of the jury instructions would have been consistent with the Legislature's intent of 
allowing the employee opportunity to come forward and protect the integrity ofthe government even 
though heated arguments and battles would no doubt take place. Portneuf's basis for termination 
would not have been viable and the jury would have reached an accurate verdict under the premise 
that Van could rightfully become upset when his was pursuing his complaints. The verdict would 
likely have turned in favor of Van. 
Portneuf argues that Van's requested jury instructions were not based on applicable Idaho 
statute or precedent. Respondent's Brief, p. 52. This argument does not tell the whole story. The 
fact of the matter is that none of the Idaho cases dealing with this whistleblower statute give any 
direction whatsoever on whistleblower jury instructions, let alone provocation instructions. See 
Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 224 P.3d458 (2008); Smith v. Mitton, 140 
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Idaho 893, 104 P.3d 367, (2004); Mallonee v. State,139 Idaho 615,84 P.3d 551 (2004), Kelso v. 
Lance, 134 Idaho 373, 3 P.3d 51,(2000); and Hufford v. Mcenaney, 249 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2001). 
The jury should be instructed concerning every reasonable claim supported by the pleadings 
and the evidence. Watson v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643, 666, 827 P.2d 656, 679 
(1992). "A requested instruction must be given if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to 
support it." Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 750, 86 P.3d 458,464 (2004), citing Lubcke v. Boise 
City/Ada County Housing Authority, 124 Idaho 450, 461-62,860 P.2d 653,664-65 (1993). There 
was certainly sufficient evidence of provocation by Portneuf to warrant the utilization of the 
provocationjury instructions in this case. Portneuf minimized its wrongdoings, prohibited Van from 
voicing his concerns, and justified rather than disciplined Nielsen for his actions and statements 
toward Van. The district court's decision that the evidence did not support the use of such 
instructions was erroneous and adversely affected the outcome of the trial. 
Portneuf appears to contend that in order for the provocation j ury instructions to apply, Van 
would have had to respond impulsively to the occasions when he was provoked. Respondent's Brief, 
p. 54. First of all, the district court made no finding that the cases cited by Van required a finding 
of impulsivity in order for jury instructions to apply. Even if it had, the evidence shows that Van 
acted emotionally to the provocation. While Policy Letter 12 did remain on the books, it was 
nonetheless written as emotional response the very same day Van was provoked. 
Portneuf's argument that Van's March 28th letter could not have been an emotional response 
because it took him four days to draft his letter is without merit. Portneuf presents no evidence to 
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show that had it been an emotional response, he would have written it sooner. Finally, while 
Portneuf argues that Van did not make any impulsive or emotional outbursts in the April 1 meeting, 
the evidence shows that he was nonetheless provoked. Portneufs inaccurate perception of Van's 
attitude in the April 1 meeting in part prompted Audrey Fletcher to investigate Van's supposed 
improprieties. To argue that Van didn't raise his voice simply does not nullifY the fact that Portneuf 
considered him a troublemaker during and after the meeting. The provocation instructions were 
needed to place the correct light on the dastardly image of Van that Portneuf portrayed to the jury. 
Van asserts that the inclusion ofthe provocation jury instructions is in line with the body of 
the current whistleblower law. It does not stand to reason that the Legislature, in its enactment of 
the whistle blower statute, would intend that an employee would lose the protection of an anti-
discrimination statue by becoming angry in his reporting of protected activity. Logic would indicate 
that any employee would normally be upset ifhislher employer kept violating federal regulations as 
Portneuf did. To not allow the jury to consider provocation in whistleblower cases is contrary to the 
legislative intent of the statute. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR REGARDING THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE BY 
AGREEING WITH RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL'S FOUNDATION-LESS 
ARGUMENTS 
The allowance of misleading conduct is an error of law over which this Court exercises free 
review. Bailey, 139 Idaho at 751, 86 P.3d at 465, citing Schaefer v. Ready, 134 Idaho 378, 381, 3 
P.3d 56, 59 (Ct. App. 2000), Bouten Construction Co. v. HF. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 992 
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P.2d 751 (1999). Portneuf s counsel repeatedly misled the district court on evidentiary matters. 
Van's counsel was required to spend significant amounts of time showing that Portneufs counsel 
was wrong. Van was improperly interrupted and unduly delayed in the presentation of his evidence. 
Portneufs counsel's baseless arguments inappropriately prolonged the trial. The length ofthe trial 
was likely the reason why the jury took only three hours deliberating. 
Portneufs counsel's argument that Humphrey was not a party to the lawsuit was improper. 
She played in a key management role in terminating Van, and thus was part of the entity which 
comprised Defendant. When Gordon Roberts attempted to talk about what Alzola had said, 
Portneufs counsel objected without giving any explanation for the objection whatsoever. The 
district court then promptly sustained the objection. Portneuf s counsel kept asserting that employee 
statements were hearsay and Van's counsel kept arguing to the court that they were not. Van tried 
to testify as to statements given by both Waller and Stoltz, but Portneufs counsel kept objecting. 
The district court informed Van's counsel to just keeping trying his case as he normally would. The 
result was that the district hindered Van from freely presenting his evidence by delaying his rulings 
on such evidence. 
Portneuf claims that "after considering the relevant case law, the court determined that 
statements made by PMC employees that were within the scope of their employment would not be 
excluded as hearsay." Respondent's Brief, p. 42. This statement is telling, because it seems to infer 
that the district court was blindly accepting Portneufs counsel's objections until it had actually had 
ApPELLANT/CROSS RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF -21-
the opportunity to review the law. Had Portneuf s counsel been following the law in the first place, 
the jury's time would not have been wasted. 
Portneufis correct in stating that when the district court had finally realized what was going 
on, it allowed Van's counsel to go back and ask for more questions. Respondent's Brief, pp. 42- 43. 
However, Portneuf seems to use this fact to assuage its conscience for the bad acts that it committed. 
The real meaning of Portneuf s argument is that even though substantial time was spent refuting 
counsel's unsubstantiated 0 bj ections, it didn't reall y matter because Van was able to go back and say 
what he wanted. Van could have not gone back and retraced his steps as to the testimony given 
because it would have taken too long, and the damage had already been done. 
It should also be noted that three days after the district court tried to correct its path on 
hearsay evidence, Portneufstill objected to employee statements as hearsay (Van's recount of what 
Kirk Cornnelius had said) and the district court sustained the objection. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 
55-56. Portneufwas relentless at interrupting Van and prohibiting him from presenting his case. 
Critical to the presentation of V an's case was the discussion of federal regulations pertaining 
to air carrier safety. Portneuf repeatedly attempted to prohibit Van from addressing OSHA and 
various federal regulations. Van was not able to speak freely about the very issues of the case, 
violations of federal regulations, because Portneuf would keep objecting and the district court 
inappropriately sustained the objections. 
Portneuf further argues that Van has admitted using other methods to get the message out 
without actually stating what the hospital employee had said. Respondent's Brief, p. 43. What Van 
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argued was actually this, " ... Van was forced to invent methods to get the message out without 
actually stating what the hospital employee had said." Appellant's Brief, p. 57. Portneuf acts as if 
it was perfectly fine to cause Van to struggle and weave and dodge in order to present his case. 
Regardless of whether the evidence may have possibly come out through the strained and laborious 
process, the fact of the matter remains that Portneuf should never have made the objections in the 
first place. Had Van been able to freely express what the pilots and administration were saying, the 
case would not have been riddled with objections and interruptions. The district court's allowance 
ofPortneuf's counsel's misleading and inappropriate objections resulted in the choppy, poor flowing 
presentation of evidence which worked a severe prejudice to Van's case. 
Portneuf argues that the district court's admission of Exhibit 320 was harmless error because 
Van failed to object to Exhibit 317-319. Respondent's Brief, p. 47. This argument again fails to 
address all the facts and circumstances and therefore must fail. 
Before Portneuf offered any ofthe exhibits as evidence, Van's counsel argued that the 2009 
emails were very prejudicial, and had no bearing on the case. The court denied Van's counsel's 
motion to exclude the evidence and indicated that it would hear objections as they came up. 
However, when Portneuf's counsel actually introduced Exhibit 320, the district court did not ask for 
any specific objections, but simply acknowledged counsel's continuing objection and admitted the 
exhibit. Tr. p. 435, 11. 10-18. The district court had made up its mind that the emails were going to 
come in and any objections otherwise would have been futile. 
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Van's counsel's non-objection to the admission of the other three emails does not serve to 
render the admission of Exhibit 320 as harmless error. Counsel never waived the objection to the 
admission ofthe email to CEO Hermansen. The email was written years after the decision was made 
to terminate and was so far removed from the termination that any number of factors could have 
intervened to cause Van to write the email. The evidence was not proximately related to the reasons 
proffered for Van's termination and the district court abused its discretion by admitting such 
evidence. 
D. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT ALLOWING THE 
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE REGARDING PAIN AND SUFFERING 
In Van's previous briefing, Van addressed the term "other remuneration" found in Idaho 
Code §6-2106 and cited to definitions of remuneration as "recompense, pay" and "a payment or 
reward for goods or services or for losses sustained or the convenience caused." Appellant's Brief, 
p. 64. A damage award for pain and suffering falls squarely within the definition of remuneration. 
Such usage of the term also comports with the language in Idaho Code §6-2105 which addresses 
injury or loss. It is unclear where Portneuf stands on this specific issue on appeal because it failed 
to even address the argument. The district court erred by not including pain and suffering awards 
within the term "other remuneration". 
Portneuf claims that the "wrenching dilemmas that Van was placed in by engaging in 
protected activity", would have been improper pleas to the jury for sympathy. Respondent's Brief, 
p. 51. This is certainly not an accurate portrayal of Van's argument. Had Van been able to present 
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evidence of the pain and suffering he endured while pursuing his complaints, the jury would have 
had a more complete set of evidence showing that Van was genuine in his reports. If Van had just 
been out to create havoc in the LifeFlight team as Portneuf claims, he would not have experienced 
the depression and anxiety that he did. By prohibiting the admission of such evidence, the district 
court substantially prejudiced Van in being able to tell his whole story, what he went through and 
what he experienced. Because the jury would have been able to better understand the legitimacy of 
his claims, a different verdict would have resulted. 
E. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING COSTS IN 
THE TRIAL COURT 
In awarding Portneuf costs, the district court inappropriately sided with Portneuf and cited 
Idaho Code § 12-1 Oland Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54 for its authority. Although the district 
court did reference Van's arguments that Idaho Code §6-2107 was the controlling statute, the court 
totally failed to address whether I.C. §6-2107 conflicted with I.C. § 12-101 and whether one statute 
controls over the other. R. Vol. III, p. 558. The court did even not bother to even address what role 
I.e. §6-2107 played in the assessment of costs here. Id. I.C. §6-2107 is not only applicable here, 
it is the controlling statute. 
Appellant stands corrected on its argument that I.C. § 12-1 0 1 does not authorize cost awards. 
However, the breadth ofI.C. § 12-101 in conjunction with I.R.C.P 54 is much more expansive that 
the narrow authorization of costs allowed under I.C. §6-2107. Portneufhas cited to no authority 
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whatsoever indicating that I.C. § 12-1 01 controls over, or is equally available with I.C. §6-2107 for 
the determination of cost awards in Idaho Whistleblower cases. 
I.C. §6-2107 authorizes a court to "order that reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs be 
awarded to an employer if the court determines that an action brought by an employee under this 
chapter is without basis in law or in fact." Obviously, ifthe Legislature had wanted to authorize the 
courts to award costs in cases where the employee's case had merit but the employer prevailed, it 
would have said so. 
According to Idaho Code §6-2101, the Legislature intended to protect the integrity of 
government by providing recourse for public employees who experience adverse actions as a result 
of reporting waste and violations of a laws, rules or regulations. In tum, the integrity of the 
government is protected as a result of employees believing that they will not be punished if they do 
come forward and engage in protected activity. The plain language of I.C. §6-2107 provides 
incentive to employees by stating that as long as their claims have merit, they will not be burdened 
with fees and costs if they do not prevail. To read more into I.C. §6-2107 than that greatly 
diminishes the protection that I.C. §6-2107 affords. 
The Legislature no doubt took into consideration the monetary pockets of the employees vs. 
the pockets of the employers when it fashioned the awards statute. Enlargement of the statute to 
include cost and fee awards to the employer that prevails will result in employees less likely to come 
forward, particularly if there is any chance that they will not win their case. If the incentive is 
diminished, the intended effects of the statute are also diminished. 
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Portneuf's argument that ifI.C. §6-2107 were to be the exclusive remedy for fees and costs, 
it would have said so, is not persuasive. Respondent's Brief, p. 57. Such argument is not an 
accurate representation ofIdaho law. For example, Idaho Code §45-612 provides that any employee 
seeking to collect unpaid wages based on false claims, "shall be liable for attorney's fees and costs 
incurred by the employer .... " I.C. §45-612(2). There is absolutely no language that mandates that 
the statute be the exclusive remedy for employers seeking attorney fees and costs under these 
circumstances. And yet, this Court has held that the exclusive remedy for attorney fees available to 
an employer when an employee has brought a claim for wages is under I.C. §45-612(2). Zattiero v. 
Homedale School Dist. No. 370, 137 Idaho 568, 572, 51 P.3d 382,386, (2002) citingShayv. Cesler, 
132 Idaho 585, 587-88,977 P.2d 199,201-02 (1999). See also Schoonover v. Bonner County, 113 
Idaho 916,923, 750 P.2d 95, 102 (1988)(the Court overturned the decision of the district court in 
a wage claim case which had given an award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. §12-121). 
Statutes are in pari materia if they relate to the same subject. Statutes that are in pari materia 
must be construed together to effect legislative intent City o/Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent 
Highway Dist., 72 P.3d 905, 908, 139 Idaho 65, 68 (Idaho 2003) citing Gooding County v. Wybenga, 
137 Idaho 201, 46 P.3d 18 (2002). Idaho's wage claims statutes and the Idaho Whistleblower Act 
relate to the same subject, particularly employees's claims against employers. Although the remedies 
are broader in the Whistleblower Act, both sets of statutes pertain to claims against employers for 
wages. It therefore follows that if the wage claims statutes provide the exclusive remedy for fees, 
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the Whistleblower statutes should also provide the exclusive remedy for fees in order to truly effect 
the legislative intent. 
Portneuf goes so far as to say that if the court found Van's claims to be without basis in law 
or fact, the court could have awarded costs under I.C. §6-2107 that could not have been awarded 
under I.R.C.P. 54. Respondent's Brief, p. 57. Such a combination would produce an excessively 
harsh result for the employee and an unreasonable windfall for the employer. See Rodwell v. 
Serendipity, Inc., 99 Idaho 894, 895,591 P.2d 141, 142 (1979)(award of attorney fees in addition 
to treble damages would constitute an unreasonable windfall for the employer and would punish the 
employer too harshly). To tax the employee for any and all expenses requested because his case did 
not prevail is inconsistent with the legislature's intent and again, would cause a chilling effect upon 
those employees who would otherwise be willing to pursue legal and factual based claims against 
their employers. 
Portneufhas failed to address Van's argument that I.C. § 12-1 01, the general statute regarding 
costs, does not control over the more specific statute, I.C. §6-21 07. In Fairfax v. Ramirez, 133 Idaho 
72, 79,982 P.2d 375,382 (Ct. App. 1999), the Court of Appeals addressed whether attorney fees 
should be granted on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3), rather than the more specific statute, Idaho 
Code §45-513, which does not allow the recovery of attorney fees on appeal. The Court of Appeals 
stated: 
In light of the clear legislative intent to restrict the recovery of attorney fees in a lien 
foreclosure to those incurred in district court, we cannot say that recovery may be had 
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under another, less specific statute. Accordingly, we decline to award Fairfax 
attorney fees for his prosecution of the cross-appeal. Id 
Similarly, costs in this case should not have been awarded under I. C. § 12-1 0 1 because it is 
the less specific statute. 
This Court has indicated that to determine the legislative intent of a statute, the Court 
examines not only the literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of proposed 
constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. City o/Sandpoint v. 
Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 72 P.3d 905,908,139 Idaho 65, 68 (Idaho 2003) citing Lopez 
v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 136 Idaho 174,30 P.3d 952 (2001). The clear legislative intent 
of I.C. §6-2107 was to restrict cost awards to cases in which there was no basis in law or fact. 
Recovery simply cannot be had under another less specific statute. The district court's failure to 
recognize the intent ofthe legislature and determine that I.C. §6-21 07 was controlling was an abuse 
of discretion and must be reversed. 
F. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
This Court, in Van v. PortneufMedical Center, 147 Idaho 552,212 P.3d 982, ordered that 
the district court may order costs and fees incurred with respect to the appeal to the party that 
prevails on remand. Van, 147 Idaho at 562, 212 P.3d at 992. It is Appellant's position that even 
with this authorization, the district court was still required to act consistently with applicable legal 
standards. The district court did not do so and its decision regarding costs and attorney's fees on 
appeal must be reversed. 
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The right to recover costs is statutory and no cost can be granted without statutory 
authorization. Idaho Power v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 102 Idaho 744, 750, 639 P.2d 
442,448 (1981). Attorney fees will not be awarded without citation to applicable statutory basis for 
the award. PHH Mortgage Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 641, 200 P.3d 1180, 1190 
(2009). 
InPolkv. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303,315, 17 P.3d 247,259 (2000), this Court considered the 
parties' requests under I. C. § 12-120 for attorney fees on appeal in a wage claim case. This Court, 
noted that I.C. §12-120 was not an appropriate source for awarding attorney fees in wage claim 
disputes and found that "neither party has claimed attorney fees under the correct section of the Idaho 
Code. Therefore no attorney fees awarded on appeal." Id Polk plainly indicates that if attorney fees 
are requested under the wrong section of the Idaho Code, they will not be granted. 
Portneuf states that, "Although PMC argued that it was entitled to fees on appeal under 
section 12-121, it also argued it was entitled to fees under section 12-120(3) for prevailing on the 
contract claims." Respondent's Brief, p. 59. This statement is somewhat misleading, because 
Portneuf did not request this Court to award fees on appeal under I. C. § 12-120 and it did not request 
the district court to award fees on appeal under I.C. §12-120 in its Memorandum of Costs. In its 
initial Respondent's Brief filed on the first appeal in this case, the only rules and statutes Portneuf 
cited in its requests for costs and fees on appeal were I.A.R 41(a) and 11.1, and I.C. § 12-121. R. pp. 
517-518. None ofthe appellate rules cited by Portneufapplyto costs on appeal and I.C. § 12-1210nly 
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applies to attorney fees. Portneufsimply did not make a proper request for an award of fees on 
appeal under I.C. §12-120. 
After the district court trial, Portneuf submitted Defendant's Memorandum of Costs and Fees. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 345. Portneuf made no request whatsoever that attorney fees and costs should 
be awarded under I.C. §12-120 in either its Memorandum of Costs of in the Affidavit of Paul 
McFarlane in Support of Defendant's Memorandum of Costs. R. pp. 345-352, 353-358. 
Consequently, when Van filed his Motion to Disallow Fees and Costs and supporting Memorandum, 
he addressed the citations utilized by Portneuf. He did not address the application of I. C. § 12-120 
to an award of costs and fees on appeal. In fact, Van stated in his Memorandum that "Portneuf did 
not seek attorney fees on appeal based on any contractual basis or any statutory basis other than I.C. 
§ 12-121." R. p. 497-498, 504. 
In the last sentence of Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to 
Disallow Fees and Costs, Portneuf states, "PMC is also entitled to its fees and costs on appeal under 
Section 12-120(3) as PMC is now the prevailing party on all claims. R. p. 548. This Court has ruled 
that the mere citation to code provisions without an explanation how the code section provides for 
an award in the case or providing argument of how the section applies to the circumstances in the 
case, is insufficient for an award of attorney fees on appeal. Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278, 288, 281 
P.3d 115, 125(2012) citing Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 805, 241 P.3d 972, 978 (2010). 
Portneuf provided an explanation of how I.C. §12-120(3) provides for the award that Judge 
McDermott made but not for the award that applies to the appeal, other than stating that it is the 
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prevailing party. R. p. 548. To receive an award for attorney fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-120(3), 
Portneuf should have explained to the district court why it was entitled to such award when it didn't 
ask this Court for such award. Furthermore, Portneuf should have explained why it didn't request 
such an award in its Memorandum of Costs. Finally, Portneuf should have explained why it was 
seeking all fees on appeal when it didn't prevail on Van's Whistleblower case on appeal. 
Portneuf only refers to I. C. § 12-120 once in its oral argument during the hearing on Plaintiff s 
Motion to Disallow Fees. It appears that the discussion was about Judge McDermott's award. Tr. 
Volume Two, p. 1443,ll. 14-25,p. 1434,ll.1-3. Thus, Portneufdid not use oral argument to explain 
why it should be allowed to claim fees on appeal under this statute even though it didn't request such 
an award before this Court or in its Memorandum of Costs. 
Portneuf s one sentence statement at the end of its Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff s 
Motion to Disallow Fees and Costs was an afterthought, accompanied by no argument. Fees on 
appeal under I. C. § 12-120(3) cannot be awarded on such a minimal, untimely sentence. 
Apparently, Portneufhas realized the significance of this error, given the fact that it has now 
stated, "this Court determined that the district court should award fees on appeal to the prevailing 
party, despite any alleged deficiencies in the briefing." Respondent's Brief, p. 58 (emphasis added). 
First, this Court did not order that the "district court should award fees on appeal". This Court 
ordered that the "district court may award costs and fees .... " Van, 147 Idaho at 562,212 P.3d at 
992. Second, this Court did not give blanket authority to the district court to award costs and fees 
regardless of what Portneuf cited in the briefing or what is required by Idaho law. There is nothing 
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in this Court's order that states the district court is to award fees and costs on appeal despite the facts 
that Portneufs requests were made on the wrong statute and certainly were not made on the statute 
it is now relying upon. Portneuf has offered no explanation whatsoever as to why it should be 
allowed to claim fees based on the wrong statute, on a statute it didn't cite, and without explanation 
as to why the statute should apply. 
Portneufhas admitted that the district court did not specifY a statutory basis for its award of 
fees on appeal. Respondent's Brief, p. 59; R. p. 567-68. It exercising its discretion, the district court 
was required to act within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it Cookv. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 29, 
13 P.3d 857,860 (2000). These legal standards required the district court to award fees on appeal 
based on the applicable statute cited and argument given by Portneuf. The district court did not act 
within applicable standards because it did not based its award of fees on any statute, let alone the 
statute Portneuf actually cited. 
During the hearing on Plaintiff s Motion to Disallow Costs and fees, Plaintiff's counsel 
repeatedly reminded the district court that in exercising its discretion, it still had to follow the 
statutes. Regarding the language ofthis Court's order indicating that the district court "may" award 
costs and attorney fees on appeal, the court and Plaintiffs counsel had the following discussion: 
MR. NIELSON: Well, it says that you "may". 
THE COURT: "May." 
MR. NIELSON: You may be able to. And I think that pertains to the Court's 
discretion. Absolutely. But you still have to follow the statutes. 
Tr. Volume Two, p. 1402,11.24-25, p. 1403,11. 1-3. 
ApPELLANT/CROSS RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF -33-
Later on in the discussion, Plaintiffs counsel stated: 
They didn't - even if the Court says - even if this Court says, "You're entitled to 
attorney's fees on appeal, you've got to look at a statute. They've cited to no 
authority indicating that you don't have to look at a statute. 
* * * 
So even if the Court does find attorney's fees on appeal against my client, you've got 
to go to a statute. And there is no statute that allows this Court to award fees. There 
just simply is not. They've only cited 12-121, and it does not work here. 
* * * 
Okay. Your Honor, we would just submit to the Court that there's got to be a 
statutory basis, and there's got to be language that allows you to do this. And they 
don't have the statutory basis, and they don't have the language they need. Thank 
you. 
Tr. Volume Two, p. 1435,11. 11-15,23-25, p. 1436,11.1-2, p. 1439,11.2-6. 
Despite the fact that the district court repeatedly heard that there must be a statutory basis for 
awarding fees, the district court nonetheless cited no statute. The district court abused its discretion 
by awarding fees based without statutory authority. 
The likely reason that the district court did not cite a statute for the award of fees on appeal 
is that Portneuf never gave it an applicable statute to cite. Both Portneuf and the district court failed 
here. Portneuf attempts to make two wrongs into a right by arguing, "an appellate court can affirm 
a district court decision on any ground supported by the record, even if that is not the basis for the 
district court's decision." Respondent's Brief, p. 59. In other words, Portneuf would have this Court 
reach the decision it wants by ignoring all statutory authority and case law which mandates the 
proper way to seek and award fees. Such argument has no merit whatsoever. 
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In sum, Portneuf did not properly request fees on appeal. The court abused its discretion by 
acting as if Portneuf had made a proper request and by failing to base its award on statutory 
authority. Such facts require the reversal and remand of the district court's award of fees and costs 
on appeal. 
IV. 
CROSS-RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT AGAINST CROSS-APPEAL 
Portneuf claims that it is entitled to reinstatement of Judge McDermott's breach of 
employment contract damages on summary judgment because the district court did not properly 
interpret the ambiguity in this Court's remand language and interpreted this Court's language too 
narrowly. Respondent's Brief, p. 59. Portneufs argument is flawed because there is no ambiguity 
in this Court's language. Furthermore, the district court's ruling was correct because this Court gave 
no authority to the district court to reinstate the award, particularly an award that has not been 
reviewed or tested by this court on appeal. The district court did not abuse its discretion here. 
A. THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY IN THIS COURT'S ORDER RE BREACH OF 
CONTRACT DAMAGES 
Regarding this Court's remand in Van I, this Court found as follows: 
The district court's decision is affirmed with regard to Van's contract claims, vacated 
with regard to his Whistle blower Act claim, and remanded for further proceedings 
on the Whistleblower Act claim. The district court's award of attorney fees and 
costs is vacated. We award no costs or attorney fees on appeal. The district court 
may award costs and fees incurred with respect to the appeal to the party that prevails 
on remand (emphasis added). 
Van, 142 Idaho at 562. 
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BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1388 (5th ed.1979) includes the following definition of 
"vacate": 
To annul; to set aside; to cancel or rescind. To render an act void; as to vacate an 
entry of record, or a judgment. As applied to a judgment or decree, it is not 
synonymous with "suspend" which means to stay enforcement of judgment or decree. 
A judgment vacated on appeal is of no further force and effect." Riha v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. 
Corp., 533 F.2d 1053, 1054 (8th Cir.1976) (per curiam). The mandate of the reviewing court is 
binding upon the lower court, and must be strictly followed. A trial court has no authority to enter 
any judgment or order not in conformity with the order of the appellate court. Walters v. Industrial 
Indem. Co. of Idaho, 130 Idaho 836, 837, 949 P.2d 223, 224 (1997). The plain language of the 
Court's decision cancelled and voided Judge McDermott's award. The language states absolutely 
nothing about staying the award pending the decision on Van's whistleblower claims. 
B. REINSTATEMENT OF JUDGE MCDERMOTT'S A WARD WAS NOT AN ISSUE 
SUBSIDIARY TO THE DISTRICT COURT'S LIMITED JURISDICTION TO 
ASSESS COSTS AND FEES ON APPEAL 
Portneuf citesJ R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics International, Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 939 P .2d 574 
(1997) for the premise that Judge McDermott's fees should be reinstated as a subsidiary issue fairly 
comprised within this Court's remand. Respondent's Brief, p. 63. JR. Simplot, however, cites to 
instructive language in Hutchins v. State, 100 Idaho 661, 603 P.2d 995 (1979) which Portneufdid 
not cite. According to J R. Simplot, Hutchins found that "[a]fter a general reversal, a trial court is 
free to correct any error in its original findings and conclusions as to matters not passed on by the 
appellate court. J R. Simplot, 130 Idaho at 257, 939 P.2d at 576 citing Hutchins, 100 Idaho at 666, 
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603 P .2d at 1000. The Hutchins Court also stated, "Thus, after the reversal in Hutchins I, this case 
was back to where it was when the original improvident summary judgment was granted, and Judge 
Mosman was free to follow any procedure and retry any issues upon which this Court had not 
specifically passed." Hutchins, 100 Idaho at 666,603 P.2d at 1000." The language of Hutchins, 
when taken as a whole, clearly distinguishes J R. Simplot and Hutchins from the case at hand. 
Unlike Hutchins, when this Court remanded Van's whistleblower claim for further 
proceedings, the case was not back to where it was when the original summary judgment was 
granted. In J R. Simplot, Chemetics was not dealing with an attorney fee award that had been 
vacated. When the case was remanded, the issue of Chemetics being awarded fees came before the 
district court for the first time and was ancillary to this Court's decision that Chemetics prevailed 
on two claims. JR. Simplot, 130 Idaho at 257, 939 P.2d at 576. Unlike J R. Simplot, the issue of 
a fee award to Portneufwas not new to the district court. The district court in Van 1 awarded fees. 
The fee award was appealed and this Court specifically passed on this matter, leaving nothing open 
for the district court to address on this issue. 
The language ofa Remittitur provides that the opinion of the appellate court directs whether 
any continuing j urisdiction ofthe district judge exists. Hummer v. Evans ("Hummer 11"), 132 Idaho 
830, 833, 979 P.2d 1188, 1191 (1999). In Hummer II, this Court distinguished the case from J. R. 
Simplot, stating: 
This case is unlike Chemetics, where our reversal of the verdict in the first appeal in 
and of itself changed the prevailing party and thus granted the district judge 
jurisdiction to address any issue, like attorney fees, that was related to the result in 
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the appeal. In contrast, the implicit holding of Hummer I was that the district judge 
would have no jurisdiction to do anything other than enter an amended judgment. 
Jurisdiction to address a subsidiary issue such as attorney fees did not arise as a result 
of our holding. 
Hummer II, 132 Idaho at 833, 979 P.2d at 1191. 
In Van I, this Court only provided jurisdiction to proceed with Van's whistleblower claims 
on remand and to use its discretion in determining whether to award fees and costs with respect to 
the appeal. Reinstatement of the fees previously awarded certainly was not a subsidiary issue to 
proceedings on the whistleblower claims. With regard to the underlying contract action, this Court 
simply did not address the award on the claims other than to vacate it. 
C. THE FEE AWARD CANNOT BE REINSTATED BECAUSE NO DECISION WAS 
MADE ON APPEAL AS TO THE REASONABLENESS OF JUDGE 
MCDERMOTT'S AWARD 
Even if the district court had jurisdiction to address Judge McDermott's fee award, which 
Van adamantly denies, the district court could not have reinstated the award because it had not been 
scrutinized by this Court. In the first appeal in this case, Van argued that the district court's decision 
awarding all of Portneufs requests for attorney fees based on contract was an abuse of discretion 
and must be reversed. Van argued that he "should never have been assessed fees based on contract." 
See Appellant's Brief, pp. 45-46. This argument pertained to the premise that fees incurred in 
defending against whistleblower claims should be considered under the whistleblower statute. This 
issue was not addressed in Van 1. 
Where the gravamen of the Complaint regards a violation of a statute rather than a contract 
or commercial transaction, I.C. §12-120(3) does not apply. Hayden Lake Fire Protection District. 
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v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 313, 109 P.3d 161, 167 (2005), citing Shay v. Ceslar, 132 Idaho 585, 588, 
977 P .2d 199,202 (1999). The gravamen ofthe underlying action was Van's whistleblower' s claims 
asserting the violation of a statute. This gravamen is evidenced by the district court's initial decision 
and well as the proceedings on remand. This Court did not rule on this argument in the initial 
appeal. Therefore, the district court could not have reinstated a full and complete award which this 
Court did not review or test under applicable legal principles. 
This Court made no finding whatsoever that the amounts Judge McDermott awarded were 
reasonably incurred pursuant to I. C. § 12-120(3), or how much of the fee request should actually be 
awarded under that statute. Judge McDermott's award was improper primarily because fees and 
costs were included for defending against the whistleblower claims and should have been considered 
under the whistleblower statute. This Court provided no ruling and gave no jurisdiction or direction 
to the district court to determine the reasonableness of the award. Judge McDermott's award 
should not now be reinstated when it was never scrutinized on appeal to begin with. 
D. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
REINSTATE JUDGE MCDERMOTT'S AWARD 
In its decision denying Portneuf's request to reinstate Judge McDermott's award, the district 
court stated: 
The Idaho Supreme Court entered a limited and specific directive: "The district court 
may award costs and fees incurred with respect to the appeal to the party that prevails 
on remand"(citation omitted). This Court's authority does not extend to those fees 
already vacated by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
R. Vol 3, p. 568. 
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The above decision of the district court was well within the court's discretion. The district 
court perceived the issue as one of discretion. R. Vol 3, p. 567. The court acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal principles cited inJ R. Simplot, Hutchins, 
Walters and Hummer II. Finally, the district court reached its decision by an exercise of reason, as 
indicated through it's statement that it had carefully reviewed the decision of this Court. R. Vol. 3, 
pp. 567-568. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying to reinstate Judge McDermott's cost 
and fee award. 
V. 
RESPONDENT/CROSS APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO COSTS 
AND FEES ON APPEAL 
Portneuf claims that it is entitled to an award of costs and fees on appeal of this action under 
I.c. §§12-121 and 12-120(3). Respondent's Brief, p. 65. For the reasons set below, Portneufs cost 
and fee requests on appeal must again be denied. 
Portneuf once again brings a claim for fees incurred defending against Van's appeal of the 
jury's verdict on Van's whistleblower claims under I.c. § 12-121, the wrong statute. Van reiterates 
that the only statutory authority that is applicable to an award of costs and fees in his whistleblower 
claim appeal is I.c. §6-2107, which provides as follows: 
A court may also order that reasonable attorneys fees and court costs be awarded to 
an employer if the court determines that an action brought by an employee under this 
chapter is without basis in law or in fact (emphasis added). 
Van's appeal of the jury verdict certainly has basis in law and fact. As indicated above, the 
special verdict was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. The district court 
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committed reversible error in its treatment of evidence and its interpretation of the whistleblower 
statutes. 
Even if this Court were to find I.C. §12-121 applicable, which Van strongly asserts that it is 
not, Portneufis not entitled to an award of fees under this statute. An award of fees under I.C. § 12-
121 and is appropriate only when the Court, in its discretion, "is left with the abiding belief that the 
action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Nampa 
& Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Washington Fed Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 524, 20 P.3d 702, 708 
(2001) citing Owner-Operator Ind Drivers Assoc. v. Idaho Public Uti!. Comm 'n, 125 Idaho 401, 
408,871 P.2d 818, 825 (1994). See also Bingham v. Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 
987 P.2d 1035 (1999; and Management Catalysts v. Turbo West Corpac, Inc., 119 Idaho 626, 630, 
809 P.2d 487,491 (1991) (emphasis added). If there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney 
fees may not be awarded under I.C. §12-121 even though the losing party has asserted factual or 
legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation 
Dist., 135 Idaho at 524, 525, 20 P.3d at 708 -709 (2001). Also See Turnerv. Willis, 119 Idaho 1023, 
812 P.2d 737 (1991). 
Van is not asking the Court to second guess the jury's verdict. As shown above and in 
previous briefing, Portneuf s counsel made erroneous arguments throughout the trial and the district 
court inappropriately believed him. Van was repeatedly interrupted by Portneufs counsel's 
objections which destroyed the presentation of Van's evidence. The trial was unnecessarily 
prolonged by Portneufs ill-founded arguments. There is nothing unreasonable, frivolous, or 
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foundation-less about this appeal. Based on the language of the case law cited above, no attorney 
fees can be awarded by this Court on appeal under I.C. §12-121. 
With regard to Van's appeal of fees and costs awards, his appeal has basis in law and fact. 
Portneuf failed to cite the proper statutes for attorney fees and costs and yet the district court sided 
with Portneuf and abused its discretion. The district court failed to apply applicable legal principles 
in determining awards. The court either cited the wrong statute or didn't cite any statute. The 
district court awarded fees even though Portneuf cited the wrong statute, and had not cited I.C. § 12-
120(3). 
Finally, Portneuf s request for fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-120(3) is inappropriate because 
Van did not appeal contract claims, and this Court vacated the contract claims award. Portneuf s 
appeal for reinstatement of the contract award cannot prevail for the reasons set forth above. 
VI. 
APPELLANT/CROSS RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO COSTS AND ATTORNEY 
FEES ON HIS APPEAL 
Van renews his request for costs and fees on appeal under I.C. §6-21 06 ofthe Whistleblower 
Act which allows this Court to order the payment by the employer of reasonable costs and attorney 
fees. Portneuf has made no argument in its Respondent/Cross-Appellant' Brief about the 
applicability ofI.C. §6-2106 as asserted by Van. 
As stated previously, the jury's verdict was not based on the evidence and the district court 
made substantial errors in the admission of evidence and the awarding of fees and costs. Van should 
prevail on appeal and should be awarded appeal fees and costs pursuant to I.C. §6-2106. 
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VII. 
APPELLANT/CROSS RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO COSTS AND ATTORNEY 
FEES INCURRED IN DEFENDING THE CROSS-APPEAL 
Portneufhas asserted that the prevailing party in a contract action is entitled to reasonable 
attorney's fees, including fees on appeal. Respondent's Brief, p. 66. To the extent that Portneuf 
argues that costs and fees were awarded by the district court under 1. C. § 12-120(3) and should be 
awarded on appeal under the same statute, Van asserts that Portneuf s arguments must fail because 
Portneuf did not previously seek fees under I.C. §12-120(3). 
To the extent that Portneufs cross-appeal is grounded in I.e. §12-120(3), Van asserts that 
Portneuf s cross-appeal must be denied and that he should be awarded fees under this statute. There 
is no ambiguity in this Court's order regarding breach of contract damages. Reinstatement of Judge 
McDermott's award was not an issue subsidiary to the district court's limited jurisdiction to assess 
costs and fees on appeal. The fee award cannot be reinstated because no decision was made on 
appeal as to the reasonableness of Judge McDermott's award. Finally, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to reinstate the award. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury's verdict in this case must be vacated. The verdict was not supported by substantial 
and competent evidence and is inconsistent with the nature of whistleblower claims as well as 
legislative intent. The district court abused its discretion and committed reversible errors with regard 
to the admission of evidence and its allowance ofPortneuf s baseless objections. The district court 
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abused its discretion by awarding costs for the trial and in awarding Portneuf costs and fees on 
appeal. The district court's orders must be reversed and remanded. 
Portneufs cross appeal must be denied. This court's order vacating Judge McDermott's 
award was plain and unambiguous. The district court was not given jurisdiction to reinstate the 
award. The fee award cannot be reinstated because no decision was made on the contested appeal 
as to the reasonableness of the award. 
Respondent/Cross Appellant is not entitled to costs and fees on appeal. Fees should be 
awarded to Van under I.C. §6-2106 which is the correct statute for awarding costs and fees on this 
whistleblower claim appeal. Finally, to the extent that Portneufhas grounded its cross-appeal on I.C. 
§ 12-120(3), there are no grounds for the cross-appeal and Van should be also be awarded fees and 
costs under this statute. 
DATED this 4th day of June, 2013. ~L ~~ 
. ~ ~~ 
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